Security — Page 199, Lesson 296

I want to walk you through the security obligations and procedures that apply when an aircraft is subject to unlawful interference, and the measures that must be in place to protect against bombs and other threats. Let’s start with the obligations of ICAO contracting states. Every state that has signed the Chicago Convention is obliged to take all adequate measures to protect passengers and crew of any aeroplane that is subject to unlawful interference — that means hijacking, sabotage, or any other deliberate act that threatens the safety of the flight. This protection must continue until the journey can safely continue, and it includes ensuring a fully functional Air Traffic system is available to support that aircraft. If an aeroplane subject to unlawful interference needs to land, the state where it wants to land must provide landing clearance as may be necessitated by the circumstances — in other words, they cannot refuse permission to land just because the aircraft is under interference. Once that aeroplane has landed in a contracting state, that state is to take all reasonable steps to prevent the aeroplane from taking off again, unless its departure is necessary to protect human life. So the default is to keep it on the ground. Now, when an aircraft subject to interference lands in a state other than the state of registry — that is, the country where the aircraft is registered — the Authority of the state where it has landed must inform the state of registry and the state of the operator by the most expeditious means, meaning as fast as possible. Additionally, other states must be informed if their citizens are on board and have suffered fatalities or injuries, have been detained as hostages, or are known to be on board. ICAO itself must also be informed. Let’s move to the operator’s responsibilities regarding bombs and improvised explosive devices, or IEDs. An operator shall ensure that there is on board a checklist of the procedures to be followed in search of a bomb or IED in case of suspected sabotage, and for inspecting aeroplanes for concealed weapons, explosives, or other dangerous devices. This checklist must be supported by guidance on the appropriate course of action to be taken should a bomb or suspicious object be found, and information on the least-risk bomb location specific to that aeroplane. The least-risk bomb location is, as the name suggests, the preferred place on the aircraft to place any suspect or confirmed IEDs — it is the spot where, if the device were to detonate, the damage to the aircraft and risk to occupants would be minimized. Now, flight deck doors on commercial air transport aircraft must be capable of being locked and unlocked from the inside. Additionally, there must be a means available for the cabin crew to advise the flight crew of suspicious activity or security breaches. On aeroplanes with more than 60 passenger seats, or with a maximum take-off mass — MTOM — over 45,500 kg, the door must be capable of being remotely locked and unlocked from either pilot station, and a means to monitor the area immediately outside the door must be available to both pilots. The door is to be closed prior to engine start, and, other than for authorized access, is to remain closed until after engine shutdown. The door and the surrounding bulkhead must be bullet proof, and resistant to penetration by shrapnel. Let’s also look at a couple of specific points from the excerpt. If an aeroplane subject to unlawful interference lands, the state where it lands should disable it to prevent subsequent take-off — that is a physical measure to keep it grounded. Facilities for the armed forces of the state of registry, if that state is not the same as the state where the aeroplane has landed, to storm the aeroplane by force must also be provided. And notification to ICAO that the event has occurred is required. Finally, if it is suspected that a bomb is on board an aeroplane, the measures that should be taken are designed to: locate and move the device to the least-risk location and apply as much padding as possible. The excerpt lists four intended aims: disable the device, find out what will trigger the device, prevent knowledge of the device on board getting to the passengers, and locate and move it to the least-risk location with padding. The last one is the most directly actionable step described here.