Man and Machine — Page 288, Lesson 477

I want to walk you through a set of important human factors challenges that arise when we put a highly automated machine — a modern aircraft — together with a human pilot. This section is called "Man and Machine," and it's about the friction points, the traps, and the misunderstandings that can happen at that interface. Let's start with confusion. Automation is incredibly powerful — it can collect an enormous amount of information and display it all on one screen. But here's the trap: manufacturers and designers, competing with each other, tend to fall into what the book calls the "marketing trap." They want to give the crew more information than their competitor's system does. The result? A multi-facet readout — a screen with many layers or sections — that, far from making life simpler for the crew, actually tends to confuse them with the sheer volume of information displayed on one screen. So more data doesn't automatically mean better awareness; it can mean overload and confusion. Next, think about how the modern flight deck computer works. It will automatically display the current aircraft status, and it tailors that display to what the pilot is doing and to the phase of flight — takeoff, climb, cruise, descent, approach, landing. This certainly reduces pilot workload in normal conditions. But there's a risk: when the pilot is trying to solve an unusual and unexpected problem, the computer might be showing information that's tailored for normal operations, and the pilot may remain unaware of important information that isn't being highlighted. So workload reduction in routine flight can come at the cost of missing critical cues in a non-routine situation. Now, consider the displays themselves. They are so easy to use — so intuitive and polished — that when they fail, the pilot finds it difficult to fall back on traditional skills at basic instrument flying. This is especially true for younger pilots who don't have any depth of experience on more basic aircraft — aircraft with round dials, steam gauges, and less automation. If you've only ever flown with a glass cockpit, losing that display can be disorienting. On the other side of the coin, the older pilot may have a mistrust of the new computers. That mistrust can lead them to increase their own workload considerably, by doing unnecessary checking on the information the computer provides. So instead of trusting the automation and using it to reduce workload, they double-check everything manually, which defeats the purpose. Then there's the problem of understanding. The complex systems that drive the modern pilot/equipment interface — the way the pilot interacts with the aircraft's systems — cannot be understood by pilots to the same extent that more basic systems could. This problem arises partly from the sheer complexity of the system itself, and partly from the 'need to know' mechanized teaching methods — training that only teaches you what you absolutely need to operate the system, without giving you a deep understanding of how it works underneath. The book says that the commonest expressions heard on the modern flight deck are: "What's it doing now?" and "I've never seen that before." That's a telling sign of a system that's opaque to its operator. Finally, we have mode error. The automatic flight controls and engine management systems can be set up in so many different modes — different ways of operating — that it's possible for the pilot to think the system is in one mode when it's actually in another. That's a mode error, and it's a classic automation-related mistake. The excerpt cuts off there, but that's the core idea: with many modes available, the risk of selecting or assuming the wrong mode increases.