First, let's talk about the ASRS programme — Page 310, Lesson 508

I want to walk you through two reporting systems that are central to aviation safety culture, and then we'll look at real-world examples that show why they exist. First, let's talk about the ASRS programme. That stands for the Aviation Safety Reporting System, which was set up in the United States. About six years after that programme began, a similar scheme was started here in the UK. It's called the Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme, abbreviated as CHIRP. Canada and Australia have set up comparable schemes as well. Now, let's look at how the CHIRP programme actually works. It allows civilian pilots and other crew members — so that includes flight attendants, engineers, anyone working in an operational role — to submit confidential reports. Those reports go to the Royal Air Force Institute of Aviation Medicine. That's the organisation that receives and processes them. The key word here is confidential — the reporter's identity is protected, which encourages people to come forward with honest accounts of errors or incidents without fear of punishment. The findings from these reports are then published at regular intervals in a bulletin called 'Feedback'. That bulletin is made readily available to everyone in the aviation world — pilots, operators, regulators — so the whole industry can learn from what went wrong. The scope of these reports is very wide. They cover all facets of operating aircraft. That includes crew fatigue, poorly designed equipment, communication problems, and interpersonal relationships between crew members. So it's not just about technical failures — it's about the human factors that affect safety. Now, I want to read you two selected extracts from actual CHIRP reports. These are real incidents that were submitted confidentially, and they illustrate exactly the kind of thing this programme is designed to catch. The first report is about cockpit design. The reporter says: 'For the third time, I was caught by variations of switch position on our F27s.' The F27 is a twin-engine turboprop aircraft. During the after-start checks, the first officer put the water-methanol switches on instead of the pitot heaters. Water-methanol is a fluid injected into the engines for extra power, typically during take-off. Pitot heaters are used to prevent ice from forming on the pitot tubes, which measure airspeed. On some of these aircraft, the switch positions for these two functions are exchanged — they're in different locations depending on which individual aircraft you're flying. So the crew member reached for what they thought was the pitot heater switch and actually activated the water-methanol system. The reporter says: 'As full power was achieved, I was surprised to hear water-methanol flow cutting in.' They also note that their own taxi checks had failed to spot what they call an 'ergonomically induced error' — meaning the design of the cockpit layout itself set them up to make the mistake. And they add that others have made this same error several times, though it usually doesn't reach the take-off stage. The second report is also about cockpit design. It describes an incident during an intermediate approach. The captain was moving his hand from the VHF frequency selector switch — that's on the central pedestal between the pilots — to the heading select knob on the glare shield. The glare shield is the sun-shading panel above the instrument panel. As his hand moved across, his right knuckle contacted the go-around button on the left thrust lever. The go-around button, when pressed, commands the autopilot or flight director to initiate a missed approach — full power, nose up. The report says 'with the expected result' — meaning the aircraft initiated a go-around when the crew did not intend it. That's a serious distraction at a critical phase of flight. Both of these reports highlight how the physical layout of the cockpit — switch positions, button locations — can induce errors even in experienced, well-trained crews. That's exactly the kind of information CHIRP is designed to capture and share, so manufacturers and operators can fix these design issues before they lead to an accident.